Friday, April 12, 2013



What Hologram Authors Should Know
About Intellectual Property Law




By Jana M. Moser, Esq.
jmoser@gpfoxlaw.com

April 12, 2013

I.  INTRODUCTION

The growing popularity of holographic performances in the entertainment industry promises to trigger a slew of legal disputes. This new frontier of entertainment will generate often-conflicting legal positions from celebrities and intellectual property rights holders, on the one hand, and the public, on the other. The purpose of this article is to explore the various legal implications that holographic performances have for the entertainment industry, and to assist those interested in creating holographic performances (“hologram authors”) to avoid legal disputes as holographic performances become a part of mainstream culture.

II. THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY’S HOLOGRAPH: AN ILLUSION

The recent proliferation of current and planned holographic performances has been the result of the phenomenal popularity of Tupac Shakur’s post-mortem appearance at the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Annual Festival in 2012. Tupac’s performance, though lauded as a hologram, was achieved not by bona fide holographic technology, but rather by an illusion developed in the 1860s known as Pepper’s Ghost.[1]  The illusion is created by the reflection of light off a reflective screen set at a 45-degree angle to the audience.  The so-called “hologram” actually is an object or image hidden from the audience and reflected off of the screen.
A hologram, by contrast, is a photographic image that is three-dimensional and appears to have depth. Holograms work by creating an image composed of two superimposed, two-dimensional pictures of the same object seen by different reference points. The use of slightly offset reference points is designed to mimic the image interpreted by the human brain, which likewise receives a distinct, slightly offset image from each eye that the brain combines into a three-dimensional image.
Tupac’s hologram was designed by a creative team at Digital Domain Media Group, James Cameron’s visual effects company, which also was responsible for the computer-generated representation of an aged Brad Pitt in The Curious Case of Benjamin Button. The Digital Domain Media Group team carefully reviewed old footage of Tupac to recreate his characteristic movements and likeness into a video that then was projected onto a screen on stage. Thus, what appeared to be a three-dimensional hologram was, in fact, a two-dimensional projection. The projection—or rather, multiple high-definition projection streams—was delivered by AV Concepts, which utilized a Musion Eyeliner screen[2] and a 30 x 13 projection system, customized by the company to descend onto the stage in mere seconds under the cover of darkness to assist in the audience’s perception of Tupac as a hologram.[3]

III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

A.   Celebrities’ Rights

Before discussing the legal implications of holographic performances, it is important to first understand celebrities’ various rights. First, notwithstanding the various exceptions found in federal copyright law (most notably, the work for hire doctrine), celebrities and other artists own the copyright to their work.[4] Copyright protects original works of authorship, including literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works. From the moment an artist “fixes” a work (whether it be a novel, movie, or song) in a “tangible medium of expression,” that work is protected under federal copyright law. The artist then enjoys a number of exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work to the public, perform the work publicly, and display the work publicly. Notably, copyright protection lasts well beyond the author’s death; for works published after 1978, the copyright term is generally 70 years after the death of the author, while works published before 1978 enjoy a comparable term, albeit with a more complex calculation.[5]
Celebrities also can own a trademark to their name. A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol or design (or a combination of them) that identifies and distinguishes the source of goods or services.[6] A celebrity’s right to the trademark in his or her name may arise at common law from actual use of the mark or through an application filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).[7] Generally, the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that is “primarily merely a surname” because personal names typically are descriptive and do not function as a trademark.[8] A surname may be registered as a trademark, however, if through extensive and exclusive use, the public comes to recognize the surname as a source of particular goods or services; in trademark law, this is known as acquiring “secondary meaning.”[9] Many well-known individuals and celebrities (or their estates) have registered their names as trademarks with the PTO, including Britney Spears, Paris Hilton, Elvis Presley, Muhammad Ali, Donald Trump, and Celine Dion, to name a few. Others have gone further and established secondary meaning between their name and a product or industry beyond their status as a celebrity. By way of example, Paul Newman established a valid trademark in both his name as a celebrity, providing “entertainment services comprising dramatic performances by an actor in movies and on television,”[10] and in the food industry through his store brand, Newman’s Own.[11] Through trademark law, celebrities protect themselves and their name from “dilution,” which occurs when a mark is used in a manner that will tarnish or cheapen the “brand” associated with the celebrity’s name or likeness. The trademark can last indefinitely, so long as the mark continues to be in use.
Most states protect celebrities during their lifetime against the unauthorized commercial use of the celebrity’s name, image, likeness, voice, and signature.[12] These “rights of publicity” or “personality rights” allow celebrities to stop unauthorized uses of the celebrity’s name, likeness, etc. and to seize infringing goods. In recent years, the protection afforded to personality rights has extended even after the celebrity’s death, though the states vary in the degree of protection afforded, with some states providing only limited protection and others continuing the protection for up to 100 years after death.
It is critical that hologram authors consider these rights and acquire appropriate licenses because of the vast legal and financial ramifications likely to follow if holographic performances are not licensed appropriately. For instance, copyright law allows plaintiffs to obtain injunctions to prohibit future copying and monetary damages to compensate for the infringing use and, in some cases, punish the defendant for copyright infringement. Similarly, trademark law provides that successful plaintiffs may be awarded injunctions against further infringing or diluting use of the trademark, while monetary relief may be available to recover the defendant’s profits, damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the costs of the action.[13] Right of publicity lawsuits engender similar risks; for example, Woody Allen was reported to have settled a right of publicity lawsuit against American Apparel, Inc. for $5 million (half of what the actor was seeking in damages) based solely on the company’s use of two unlicensed, unauthorized billboards featuring his image in New York and Los Angeles.[14]

B.   Copyright Law

Holograms present a unique conglomeration of copyrighted or copyrightable material, and thus present several areas of note for the entertainment industry’s use of holographic performances.
First, in the case of holograms featuring deceased celebrities, it is likely that the majority of celebrities relevant to today’s culture—and by extension, today’s target audience—will date only as far back as the advent of “talkies” in cinema and, therefore, will have passed away within the last 80 to 90 years (though holograms featuring historic public figures including, for example, deceased presidents or famous writers and musicians also are likely to appear). With respect to licensing material or the right to create derivative works, hologram authors must consider whether the material from which they draw remains under the protection of copyright law or whether the material has become a part of the public domain. Though the statutory provisions governing copyright duration use different standards depending on whether federal statutory copyright protection was secured after January 1, 1978, the date the current law took effect, any published work created in the last 90 years almost certainly will remain protected by federal copyright and therefore require a license for its use. If the hologram author wishes to draw from works created in 1978 or after, the copyright duration for published works is 70 years after the death of the author.[15] If the hologram author draws from works created before 1978—a time period that would include performances by Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and the Beatles, just to name a few—then the work generally will be protected by copyright for 95 years after the date of first publication.
On the other hand, the United States is entering the final years of protection for several famous characters; should hologram authors wish to create holographic performances based on those characters, the question of licensing will become one of trademark (which can last forever), not copyright. Perhaps the most famous character scheduled to enter the public domain is Mickey Mouse, who first made an appearance in a 1928 animated short film called Steamboat Willie. Scheduled to enter the public domain four times since its creation, the Mickey Mouse character will enter the public domain in 2023 absent another amendment and extension to the U.S. copyright term.[16] Once characters like Mickey Mouse enter the public domain, hologram authors freely may view, edit, or transform the characters with no regard for the copyright owner’s (for example, The Walt Disney Company) creative or monetary interests. Thus, for example, rival companies may create a holographic Mickey Mouse production freely; indeed, after 2023, even a virtually identical holographic reproduction of Steamboat Willie would not be an infringing work under the law. As discussed below, however, trademark rights would remain a potential obstacle for this use. 
The second feature that hologram authors must consider is the layers of a hologram that may be copyrighted as a new work or derivative work: the holographic image itself, and the recording used in conjunction with the holographic image. Thus, if a hologram author is considering creating a hologram based on a deceased celebrity, the author will need to acquire rights from the owner of the reproduced image as well as the owner of the reproduced voice. Such licensing attempts may be complicated by the fact that both rights will not necessarily be held by the same entity. Additionally, the holographic image may be an entirely new work (that is, an original image or character created entirely from new content), or it may be a derivative work (that is, based on, or derived from, another copyrighted work). Similarly, the voice recording may be an entirely new work (as will be the case if the hologram is not based on any former copyrighted work), an exact reproduction of an old recording, or a combination of the two. Thus, in the case of holographic performances by dead celebrities, the simplest scenario (that is, a hologram drawing from a recorded image owned by a single copyright owner and a recorded voice owned by a single copyright owner) presents at least two sources of content that must be considered for the purpose of licensing the artist: the image and the recording.
Nevertheless, unless the hologram is an exact reproduction of an existing recorded performance, it is more likely that the hologram will draw from multiple images and voice recordings. This might be the case if an original holographic concert is created that draws from multiple recorded concerts that took place throughout the deceased artist’s life. In this case, unless each recorded performance is owned by a single copyright holder, the hologram author will need to procure licenses to use the copyrighted material from each separate rights holder. Additionally, the hologram author will need to acquire the right to create a derivative work—that is, an expressive creation that includes major copyright-protected elements of an original, previously created first work—from each separate rights holder.[17] The equation becomes increasingly complex if different owners own the copyright to each performance and recorded song. Again, the hologram creator will need to acquire the right to create the derivative work from each copyright holder.
The Tupac holographic concert illustrates this concept. The Tupac image was created through computer graphics based both on physical characteristics and movements from the performances recorded before the rapper’s death as well as fresh movements and new dialogue.[18] The rights to create Tupac’s hologram reportedly were fairly easy to acquire, as the controller of Tupac’s estate—his mother, Afeni Shakur—authorized the hologram in exchange for Dr. Dre’s contribution to the Tupac Amaru Shakur Foundation.[19]  Other deceased celebrities promise to be a greater challenge, however. For example, the Michael Jackson and Ray Charles estates are controlled not by the musicians’ families, but rather by professionals; for these estates, hologram authors will need to acquire rights from the professional executors. Given the litigious relationship between the executors and family members of various deceased celebrities, hologram authors also will need to be wary of the potential for conflict and/or litigation even if rights are acquired successfully from the executors of the estate.
Finally, a hologram may be an entirely original work, created with entirely new content, but nevertheless feature a deceased celebrity or public figure. In this case, the restraints presented by copyright law are less clear. If the hologram truly does not draw on past performances by the celebrity or public figure, then copyright holders (including the estates of deceased celebrities) will have little on which to base a claim for infringement or demand that the image be licensed. On the other hand, states recognizing the right of publicity for deceased celebrities and public figures potentially will provide the estate with a viable claim for infringement. Likewise, to the extent that a celebrity or public figure has become a trademark, the owners of the marks may have a viable claim to the improper use of the name or brand if the name or brand is used to market the hologram.

C.   Trademark Law

While copyright covers works of authorship, trademark, by contrast, covers the distinctive nature of a celebrity’s name and talent. Thus, while a celebrity also may control the creative content of a hologram based on his or her likeness through copyright, a celebrity may also control the commercial nature of the hologram through trademark.
The first issue a hologram author must consider is whether the hologram will infringe upon the celebrity’s trademark in his or her name as a celebrity and, if applicable, whether the hologram will infringe upon additional uses or markets to which the celebrity has attached his or her name. The use of a trademark in connection with the sale of a good constitutes infringement if it is likely to cause consumer confusion as to the source of those goods or as to the sponsorship or approval of the goods.[20]
Whether a hologram will infringe a celebrity’s trademark in his or her name largely will depend on the use to which the hologram is being put. Given the immediate surge in the popularity of holograms after Tupac’s Coachella performance, one can imagine the plethora of marketing uses to which holograms might be put: animated holograms in movie theaters may replace standard cardboard cutouts, while stationary or animated holograms may replace mannequins in store windows. Indeed, one can imagine holographic billboards replacing traditional two-dimensional billboard advertising in high-impact locations such as Times Square. When a hologram merely is replacing older forms or manners of marketing, the infringement analysis should mimic those cases that have been decided under traditional media.
Other uses of trademark are not as cut and dried, however. For instance, as described in greater detail above, the copyright in older characters like Mickey Mouse are due to enter the public domain in the next decade or two. When that happens, the creative design of the character becomes open to the public; the trademark, however, will last as long as it continues to be used commercially. Thus, while a hologram author would be able to create works based on the Mickey Mouse character, the hologram author would not be able to use the hologram to sell goods or services. Additionally, the hologram author would not be able to use the Mickey Mouse character in a way that causes confusion regarding the affiliation of the trademark owner to the image; thus, if consumers are likely to believe mistakenly that a Mickey Mouse hologram production was sponsored by Disney, then Disney may have grounds for a trademark infringement claim.

D.  Right of Publicity

Finally, the right of publicity protects the celebrity’s interest in the commercial exploitation of his or her name or likeness, including his or her name, face, signature, and voice or vocal style.
The first consideration for hologram authors interested in creating a holographic performance is whether their subject is protected by the right of publicity at all. Unlike a trademark, which may be founded in purely creative works like Mickey Mouse, the right of publicity has extended traditionally only to persons. Non-human entities such as corporations or partnerships do not enjoy the right of publicity; similarly, purely fictional, non-human characters—for instance, animated characters—do not enjoy the right of publicity. Thus, while hologram authors generally will have to secure a license to create a holographic performance based on a human likeness, there is no such requirement for holographic performances of non-human characters.
While the right of publicity does not extend to non-human entities, this right nevertheless has enjoyed some expansion in the last 30 years that warrant consideration. For instance, courts have held that the right of publicity extends to group personas like musical bands.[21] The Ninth Circuit has extended the right of publicity even further, holding that a celebrity’s right of publicity may be infringed by the unlicensed portrayal of a character played by the actor, even if the portrayal is not referencing the actor him or herself.[22] Thus, if a hologram author wishes to create a holographic performance based, for example, on a popular television series or film, the author will need to seek a license from the copyright holder for the creative element of the work, the trademark holder for advertising purposes, and possibly the actor(s) for the use of their image in both the creative and advertising elements of the hologram.
Finally, in the case of deceased celebrities, hologram authors will need to consider whether the celebrity enjoys post-mortem personality rights. The amount of protection for a deceased celebrity’s right of publicity varies widely from state to state, and the state where a celebrity is domiciled at death determines the existence of his or her post-mortem rights. The question of the post-mortem validity of the right of publicity recently was explored by Marilyn Monroe’s estate in a dispute with the estate of photographer Sam Shaw, a long-time photographer of the actress.  The dispute culminated in two court decisions that ruled against protecting her personality rights because of Monroe’s domicile at the time of her death.[23] Though Monroe lived in both California and New York, Monroe was legally domiciled in New York at the time she died, a state that provides very little post-mortem protection of personality rights. Thus, the court held that Monroe’s deceased celebrity personality rights in California were unprotectable,[24] even though California provides deceased celebrity rights protection for 70 years after the death of a celebrity.[25] In light of these cases, then, hologram authors should have an easier time acquiring the pertinent licenses for celebrities domiciled at death in New York and similarly inclined states, while celebrities domiciled in California, for instance, will present a greater barrier.

IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD

Since Tupac’s Coachella appearance, the news has increasingly announced holographic performances, concerts and alternative uses of holographic technology. Indeed, in May 2012 the Port Authority announced the purchase of three holograms programmed to answer questions most frequently asked by consumers at LaGuardia, Newark, and John F. Kennedy airports; to get information from the holograms, passengers simply have to speak to them.[26] Thus, the foregoing legal considerations promise to be only the beginning as holographic performances continue to become mainstream.
Beyond the legal considerations explored in this article, several moral considerations also are worth exploring. For instance, the question of whether a hologram author can secure the rights necessary to create a holographic performance of a deceased celebrity does not answer the question of whether he or she should. In Tupac’s case, the Tupac hologram was created with the permission of Tupac’s mother and under the meticulous care of Dr. Dre. By contrast, other deceased artists may not have a social network caring for the perfect replication of his or her likeness and mannerisms. In other cases, it may be cost prohibitive to create a holographic performance that perfectly mimics those elements; given that Tupac’s holographic performance is estimated to have cost around $100,000, studios may not be willing to replicate an artist’s mannerisms with perfect accuracy.
Other considerations relate to the artists themselves. Knowing that holographic performances are a part of mainstream entertainment—and particularly in light of the appeal of holographic performances by deceased entertainers—artists should address the question of whether and to what extent their name and likeness may be utilized as a holographic performance when negotiating contracts. Indeed, this question is as much a backward thinking issue as it is forward: for those contracts that already have been executed, an important question will be whether the rights granted by the artist included the right to create a holographic representation at all.
These issues demonstrate the important role that transactional and litigation attorneys will play in assisting the creative and business development of holographic performances in the future.


[1] Pepper’s Ghost was first used in 1863 in a production of Charles Dickens’ The Haunted Man, developed by Professor John Henry Pepper and Henry Dircks. See Author Unknown, Peppers Ghost History, Dimensional Studios, available at http://www.eyeliner3d.com/peppers_ghost_history.html; see also Devin Faraci, Tupac’s Coachella “Hologram” Achieved With Magic Trick From The 1860s, Badass Digest, April 16, 2012.

[2] The Musion Eyeliner is a high definition video projection system that allows moving images to appear within a live stage setting. The system works as a modern commercial variation of Pepper’s Ghost, wherein a thin metalized film is placed across the front of the stage at an angle of 45 degrees to the audience; below the screen is a bright image supplied by an LED screen or powerful projector. When viewed from the audience’s perspective, the reflected image appears to be onstage.
[3] See Author Unknown, Holographic Projections at the Coachella Music Festival, AV Concepts, available at http://www.avconcepts.com/coachella-2012-4/.
[4] Although the general rule is that the person who creates a work is the author of that work, there is an exception to that principle: copyright law defines a category of works called “works made for hire.” If a work is “made for hire,” the employer (i.e., a firm, an organization, or an individual), and not the employee, is considered the author. See 17 U.S.C. 101.
[5] See 17 U.S.C. § 302; see also Circular 15A, Duration of Copyright, U.S. Copyright Office.
[6] See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
[7] For example, Beyoncé Knowles and Shawn Corey Carter (“Jay-Z”) famously filed an application with the PTO to protect the name of their firstborn child, Blue Ivy, from unauthorized use. See Janean Chun, Blue Ivy Gets Trademarked By Beyoncé And Jay-Z—What it Means for Businesses, The Huffington Post, February 9, 2012.
[8] 15 U.S.C. § 1502(e)(4).
[9] See, generally, In re J.J. Yeley, 2007 WL 3095396 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2007) (allowing a well-known race car driver to register his name as a trademark).
[10] See PTO Registration Number 3257796.
[11] See, e.g., PTO Registration Numbers 4061556, 4035125, and 3133173.
[12] See Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, §§ 6:3, 6:8 (2d ed. 2008) (noting the different states that protect personality rights). As of this writing, the states that afford protection to a right of publicity are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
[13] 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
[14] See Christopher Palmeri, American Apparel Settles with Woody Allen, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, May 18, 2009.
[15] 17 U.S.C. § 302.
[16] Some legal scholars argue that Steamboat Willie is already in the public domain due to several ambiguities in the title card of the Steamboat Willie cartoon that, arguably, fail to comply with the copyright “formalities” in effect at the time the cartoon was copyrighted. See Joseph Menn, Whose Mouse Is It Anyway?, Los Angeles Times, August 22, 2008.
[17] 17 U.S.C. § 101.
[18] The image, created by visual effects company Digital Domain Media Group, was described by Ed Ulbrich as being “not found footage. This is not archival footage. This is an illusion.” Author Unknown, Coachella’s “Astonishing” Tupac Shakur Hologram: How They Did It, The Week, April 17, 2012.
[19] Danielle and Andy Mayoras, What Does Tupac’s Hologram Mean for Other Celebrity Estates?, Forbes, April 23, 2012.
[20] See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
[21] See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a group that develops market value in its persona is entitled to publicity rights in its name).
[22] See Wendt v. Host Intl. Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[w]hile it is true that [the actors’] fame arose in large part through their participation in Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose the right to control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a fictional character).
[23] Milton H. Greene Archives Inc. v. CMG Worldwide Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22213 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Milton Archives I”); Milton H. Greene Archives Inc. v. CMG Worldwide Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Milton Archives II”).
[24] Milton Archives II, 568 F.Supp.2d at 1199.
[25] Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1.
[26] See Matthew Rosenbaum, That Nice Lady at NYC Airports Is a Hologram, ABC News, May 22, 2012. 

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The Arbitration Dilemma



The Arbitration Dilemma



By Kathleen D. Cerniglia, Esq.
KCerniglia@gpfoxlaw.com

October 4, 2012

I.  INTRODUCTION

Over the last several decades the use of arbitration in place of state or federal court litigation has become prominent in this country, not only by virtue of form contracts that strong-arm unknowing potential plaintiffs into agreeing to arbitration provisions, but also by way of contracts negotiated at arm’s length.   However, there are plenty of reasons for one to pause and think carefully before agreeing to an arbitration clause. 
This is because (1) more and more defendants in arbitration have stopped paying their arbitration fees to shift them to the plaintiffs, without consequence, unless they have meritorious cross-complaints; (2) more and more arbitration administrators—who have little to no legal training—are making substantive preliminary decisions that only a judge would rule on if the same issues were in court; (3) more and more attorney-arbitrators conceal biases as they jockey to be selected, especially as arbitrators continue to push their hourly rates higher and higher; and finally, (4) more and more underfunded and overcrowded courts are reluctant to vacate even the most out-of-line arbitration awards—even those tainted with undisclosed biases.  This article briefly touches on these issues.

II. BAD FAITH SHIFT OF FEES BY ARBITRATING DEFENDANTS

When parties contractually agree to resolve potential disputes through arbitration, that contract should logically incorporate an agreement as to who will pay for those arbitration services, and a consequence for failing to do so, such as a default judgment entered in court.  After all, it is axiomatic law that a contracting party may not embrace the benefits of an agreement while simultaneously avoiding its burdens.  (See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1714; NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 82.)  This principle is founded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which “precludes a party from asserting rights he otherwise would have had against another when his conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity.”  (Id. at p. 1713.)  However, arbitrating defendants are not held to this standard:  they may simply refuse to pay their share of arbitration fees, and the private arbitration services then dismiss the proceedings unless the arbitrating plaintiffs cover 100% of the fees.
This bad faith shifting of all fees to the plaintiff(s) happens even when the contract calls for an equal split of fees.  For example, in a recent case tried by this law firm, the governing contract stated that, “[e]ach party involved in an arbitration proceeding . . . will pay his or her own expenses.  The cost of conducting the arbitration proceeding itself will be borne by each party to it in proportion to the number of shares of the Corporation owned prior to the commencement of the proceeding.”  The plain language of the agreement should have estopped the defendants from asserting and “mak[ing] use of the [agreement] so long as it work[s] to [their] advantage” while concurrently avoiding their obligations thereunder.  (Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1714.) 
Despite the well-established principle of equitable estoppel, however, no California case law requires arbitrating defendants to pay their portion of the fees, and none of the arbitration services presently do more than potentially bar the defendants’ cross-complaints, if any, and then shift all the fees to the plaintiffs pending the outcome of the dispute.  (See, e.g., JAMS Rules 6, subd. (c) & 31 [“Parties are jointly and severally liable for the payment of JAMS Arbitration fees and Arbitrator compensation and expenses” but the only remedy for the nonpayment of fees by one party is through an award of fees issued by the arbitrator]; AAA Rule R-54 [“If arbitrator compensation or administrative charges have not been paid in full, the AAA may so inform the parties in order that one of them may advance the required payment”].)   Unfortunately, until California establishes such a law, arbitrating plaintiffs in California may be forced to shoulder this substantial monetary burden in order to recover their damages.
Other states have specifically ruled on the issue of arbitration fees, and have ruled, as one would expect of our justice system, in favor of fairness and equity.  For example, in the Mississippi case of Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin (2003) 848 So.2d 828, the parties’ contract contained a provision stating that “cost of [] arbitration will be divided amongst the parties of the arbitration.” (Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, supra, 848 So. 2d at p. 836.)  Arbitration commenced and then the defendant, Sanderson Farms, refused to pay its half of the arbitration costs.  (Id. at p. 837.)  Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in the state circuit court, prompting Sanderson Farms to file a motion to compel arbitration on the basis of the parties’ agreement.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Sanderson Farms had breached the parties’ agreement by failing and refusing to pay its half of the arbitration costs, and as a result, could not “seek the protections of the arbitration provision in the [] contract.”  (Id. at p. 838; see also Simmons Housing Inc. v. Shelton (2010) 36 So.3d 1283, 1287 [“[i]n the arbitration context, equitable estoppel prevents a party from embracing the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens”].)


III. PRELIMINARY ISSUES DECIDED BY CASE ADMINISTRATORS

It is also a real possibility that an arbitration tribunal’s case administrator—who generally has little to no legal training—can facilitate a bad faith shift in fees, in addition to making other important procedural decisions.  This is because case administrators make substantive preliminary rulings before appointing an arbitrator to a case.  For example, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) allows case administrators to unilaterally waive a party’s filing fees based upon an ex parte plea of indigence, with no requirement that the party actually prove indigence with competent and admissible evidence.  AAA Rule R-49 provides, in relevant part:

The filing fee shall be advanced by the party or parties making a claim or counterclaim, subject to final apportionment by the arbitrator in the award. The AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on the part of any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees.

(AAA Rule R-49 [emphasis added].)
According to AAA’s website, it will consider deferring or reducing its administrative fee for parties whose gross annual income falls below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines.  (American Arbitration Association, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrator Services [available at www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF;
jsessionid=R295PCqYD5MkNKhQqm9H7jhSMwYh2NnsYFSbG6yrMhgmGVB299lc!1082660915?doc=ADRSTG_004098].)  However, AAA merely requires a signed affidavit from a party claiming “extreme financial hardship” and does not, as a practice, require admissible and reliable proof of salary or net worth.  In fact, AAA does not even notify the opposing party about the ex parte application, nor does it allow the opposing party to respond.  (Ibid. [“the AAA reserves the right to deny or grant any request based on the information given by the requesting party”].)
Additionally, “a party may make a request for a pro bono or reduced rate arbitrator . . . However, prior to appointment every effort is made to have the non-indigent party agree to pay the arbitrators [sic] fees.”  (Ibid. [emphasis added].)  AAA again directs that this request “be made to the Case Manager.”  (Ibid.)
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) allows case administrators to determine the location of the hearing and whether separate arbitrations should be consolidated.  (JAMS Rule 6, subd. (a) & (c).)
In both state and federal court, all of the above-described scenarios would be subject to a judge’s ruling.  It is troubling that an administrator who has no legal education can make those same adjudications in arbitration forums. 
IV.         ARBITRATOR BIAS AND FEES

California Courts widely discuss the importance of an arbitrator’s duty to disclose potential conflicts of interest.  (See Benjamin, Weill & Mazer v. Kors (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 40, 67 (“Benjamin”); see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.85, 1286.2, subd. (a)(3).)   The United States Supreme Court also directs that “we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.”  (Ibid.; citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. (1968) 393 U.S. 145, 147.) 
Thus, California law requires arbitrators to disclose “any matter that reasonably could create the appearance of partiality.”  (Haworth v. Sup.Ct. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 384-385 [emphasis added].)  Likewise, under American Arbitration Association Rule R-16, arbitrators have a standing obligation to disclose “any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship with the parties or their representatives.  Such obligation shall remain in effect throughout the arbitration.”  (AAA Rule R-16(a) [emphasis added]; see also Guseinov v. Burns (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 9444, 956.) 
In California, where the failure to disclose relates to the subject matter and issues in contention, the superior court is ostensibly required to vacate the arbitration award.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(6).)  For example, in Benjamin, supra, a law firm initiated an arbitration against a former client for unpaid fees.  The arbitration panel found for the law firm and ordered payment of the fees.  After the panel issued the award, the client discovered that the chair had failed to disclose that his practice focused on representing law firms in client fee disputes and that he was currently litigating a law firm’s fee dispute case in the California Supreme Court.  (Id. at p. 51.)  The client petitioned to vacate the award.  The court found that “representation of clients in the same position as one of the parties to the current arbitration in matters involving the same subject matter” should have been disclosed because it raised reasonable questions about the impartiality of the arbitrator.  (Id. at p. 53.) 
The Federal Arbitration Act uses a narrower standard: it permits the vacating of an arbitration award on the ground of bias only on a showing of “evident partiality” by the arbitrator.  (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).)  When the issue is the arbitrator’s failure to disclose, the Ninth Circuit interprets “evident partiality” to mean that the undisclosed facts must create a “reasonable impression of partiality.”  (Schmitz v. Zilveti (9th Cir.1994) 20 F.3d 1043, 1046.)
Regardless of which standard applies, there is a clear incentive for attorney-arbitrators to conceal their conflicts of interest:  it pays quite well to be an arbitrator.  In a complex matter, the fees paid to organizations such as AAA, ADR, or JAMS, in addition to the fees paid to a panel of three arbitrators, can reach into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.  An arbitrator’s ability to make a living provides quite the incentive for practicing lawyer-arbitrators to spin their résumés to appear more neutral than they actually are.  For example, hourly rates for arbitrators in the Los Angeles area typically range from $300 to $500 per hour.  These high rates also provide arbitrators with an incentive to prolong hearings, entertain frivolous discovery motions, take multiple telephone conferences, and require both closing arguments and post-hearing briefs.  This monetary incentive also goes against the foundation of why parties generally choose to arbitrate in the first place—to expedite proceedings.
Furthermore, there is generally no way to research what kind of decisions arbitrators have made in previous arbitrations.  While court decisions are matters of public record, few arbitration venues publish awards.  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), which is limited to those cases rooted in securities litigation, is one arbitration tribunal that does.
Notably, the fact that FINRA publishes its awards has allowed for scholarly studies of “neutral” bias in securities arbitration.  In fact, “securities arbitration has been consistently criticized as favoring the securities industry over the interests of investors.”  (Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators (2010) 39 J. Legal Studies 109, 110.)  A recent study[1] of securities arbitration in FINRA—designed to shed empirical light on the role that attorney-arbitrators play as arbitrators in securities arbitration—confirmed this criticism, finding that attorney-arbitrators who also represent brokerage firms or brokers typically award significantly less compensation to investor-claimants than do other arbitrators.  (Id. at p. 111.)  The study found that this relation is particularly prevalent when an attorney who has represented a brokerage firm chairs the arbitration panel.[2]  (Ibid.) 
The implications of this study show that parties negotiating a contract with an arbitration clause should carefully consider the possibility that the appointed arbitrators may not be neutral per se.  This potential for bias does not conform to the principles of fairness and equity that arbitration proceedings should enforce, especially in light of the fact that arbitrating parties waive their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by a jury of their peers. 

V.  LIMITED RIGHTS OF APPEAL

California allows only limited appellate rights after an arbitrator has rendered a decision.  California Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 provides, in relevant part:

 (a) Subject to Section 1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court determines any of the following:
   (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.
   (2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators.
   (3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.
   (4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.
   (5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
   (6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. However, this subdivision does not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2)
California courts hold that these are the exclusive means by which an award reached by an arbitrator is subject to judicial review.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33.)  The merits of the controversy are not reviewable by the court.  (Id. at p. 11.)  Nor will courts pass judgment upon the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning.  (Ibid.; Department of Public Health of City & County of San Francisco v. Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 790 (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 429, 433.)  Where the arbitrator’s award, on its face, “represents a plausible interpretation of the contract in the context of the parties’ conduct, judicial inquiry ceases and the award must be affirmed.”  (Screen Actors Guild v. A. Shane Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 260, 265.) 
In fact, an arbitrator’s error of law, no matter how gross, provides no basis to challenge the arbitrator’s award under California law.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11; Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 244; Baize v. Eastridge Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 293, 300-302.)  The rationale for this rule is twofold: (1) the parties contracted that the arbitrator’s decision, right or wrong, would be conclusive, and (2) the risk of arbitral error has been reduced by statutory provision allowing courts to vacate or correct for “serious problems with the award itself or with the fairness of the arbitral process.”  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 12.) 
The same concerns arise in federal courts.  The Federal Arbitration Act is similar in many respects to California’s statute set forth above.  (See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11; Baravati v. Josepthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc. (7th Cir. 1994) 28 F.3d 704, 706.)[3] 

VI.         CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are still many appealing aspects of arbitration, such as the ability to try a case much faster than it would take in court, but these advantages must be weighed against real risks that are present in arbitration.  Before recommending—or signing—a contract that includes an arbitration clause, read through it carefully, and make sure it conforms to your wants and needs.  Attorneys should explain the potential dangers of arbitration to their clients, to fully inform them before they enter into a contract that waives their Constitutional rights.  Attorneys should also consider negotiating out of an arbitration clause when it does not meet their clients’ needs.  For example, if the client is an individual, about to enter into a contract with a large corporation that regularly appears before a certain arbitration service, the client might want to carefully consider the implications of agreeing to the arbitration clause.  It is better to consider striking an arbitration agreement during the formation of the contract, rather than being left several years down the road with an arbitration decision that has been rendered by a biased arbitrator, costing tens of thousands of dollars, with minimal appellate recourse. 



[1] The study analyzed a data set of 422 randomly selected arbitrators and their 6,724 securities arbitration awards from 1992 to 2006.  (Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. Legal Studies, at p. 111.)  The authors hypothesized that “attorneys who represent brokerage firms and brokers in arbitration are likely to be skeptical of investors’ claims for compensation generally, which leads them to be less generous with arbitration awards.”  (Id. at p. 119.)  This is in part because “arbitrators need to follow existing law only loosely, do not need to provide reasons, and face only a remote possibility of judicial review [and therefore] have substantial discretion in handling any particular case,” which may allow the ideological perspective of attorney-arbitrators to influence their awards.  (Id. at p. 120.)
[2] The study noted that “[t]he chair of the panel appears to exercise the greatest degree of control over the arbitration proceedings and is typically responsible for the overall administration of the proceeding, including the resolution of discovery disputes, ruling on evidentiary issues, and so forth.”  (Id. at p. 114.) 
[3] Some corporations have recently started providing for rights of appeal within arbitration in their contracts to protect against the limited appellate rights of arbitration awards. 

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